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This section contains a digest of all reported decisions interpreting pro-
visions of the Uniform Commercial Code published during the month of
December 1965 in the National Reporter System.
PAUL F. BEATTY
RUTH R. BUDD
HUGO A. HILGENDORFF III
ARTICLE 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1-205. Course of Dealing and Usage of Trade
MARTIN V. BEN P. EUBANK LUMBER CO.
395 S.W.2d 385 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965)
This is an action by plaintiff to recover a ten per cent discount on
building materials purchased from defendant. Plaintiff attempted to procure
by interrogatories names of other persons to whom defendant had given dis-
counts to show an agreement as to the discounts, alleging that Section 1-205
made such evidence competent. The lower court held for the defendant,
stating that defendant was not required to disclose such names. The ap-
pellate court affirmed, holding that Section 1-205 may be used to explain
ambiguities in a contract, but this does not mean that a course of dealing'or
trade usage may be used to make a contract. The court further held that the
term " 'ten per cent' is a plain term requiring no trade usage or custom to
determine its meaning."
COMMENT
Contrary to the court's position, under Section 2-204, "course of dealing"
or "usage of trade" can be used to make a contract for the sale of goods. In
addition, the court erred in summarily excluding plaintiff's evidence con-
cerning the term "ten per cent" on the ground that it "is a plain term re-
quiring no trade usage to determine its meaning." The question was not
whether the term was ambiguous, but whether the agreement can be said
to have included the discount. Viewed in this light, evidence of course of
dealing or usage of trade is admissible. Section 2-202.
The court's result, however, was correct, since the evidence should have
been excluded on other grounds. The Code provides that a contract can be
explained and supplemented by (1) course of performance, (2) course of
dealing, and (3) usage of trade. Sections 1-205, -208. But the first two terms
require evidence of dealings between the parties themselves, and "usage of
trade" is defined as "any practice or method of dealing having such reg-
ularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation
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that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question." Here,
plaintiff's proffered evidence, showing transactions between the seller and
other buyers, does not fit within any of the above terms.
R.R.B.
ARTICLE 2: SALES
SECTION 2-104. Definitions: "Merchant"; "Between Merchants";
"Financing Agency"
COOK GRAINS, INC. V. FALLIS
395 S.W.2d 555 (Ark. 1965)
Annotated under Section 2-201, infra.
SECTION 2-201. Formal Requirements; Statute of Frauds
COOK GRAINS, INC. V. FALLIS
395 S.W.2d 555 (Ark. 1965)
Defendant, a farmer, allegedly entered into a verbal agreement with an
agent of plaintiff, a grain dealer, to sell 5,000 bushels of soybeans to plaintiff.
Thereafter, in confirmation of the oral agreement, plaintiff sent a proposed
written contract, which it had signed, to defendant for his signature, but
defendant neither signed nor returned the writing. When defendant refused
to deliver the beans, plaintiff brought an action for breach of the alleged
contract. Plaintiff contended that defendant was a "merchant" and that,
even though he had not signed the writing as required by Section 2-201(1),
the agreement was enforceable under Section 2-201(2) because defendant
failed to give notice of his objection to the written proposal. The trial court
entered judgment for defendant.
In affirming, the supreme court held that the defendant was not a
"merchant" within the meaning of Section 2-201(2), and thus his failure
to object to the proposed contract within ten days after he had received it
did not render it enforceable. The court interpreted the definition of "mer-
chant" in Section 2-104(1) as including only professional traders and not
farmers.
COMMENT
Although the court may not have been accurate when it determined that
a farmer is not a "merchant" within the definition of Section 2-104(1), its
decision may still be regarded as correct if the policy of giving special treat-
ment to farmers and farm products set forth in Article 9, Sections 9-109,
-307(1) and -401, is considered applicable to farmers under other Articles
as well.
It is suggested, however, that all farmers may not deserve equal treat-
ment since many men engaged in farming are now professionals within the
meaning of Section 2-104. See Section 2-104, Comment 2. To these farmers,
the provisions of Section 2-201(2) should be applicable.
H.A.H.
884
